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STATE OF IDAHO 
****************************************************************************** 
Supreme Court No. 39221-2011 
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
v. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
****************************************************************************** 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bonneville County. 
Honorable Dane Watkins, Jr., District Judge, presiding. 
****************************************************************************** 
Counsel for Appellants: 
Counsel for Respondents: 
JacobS. Wessel 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
John J. Lerma 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA 
3045 E. Copper Point Dr. 
PO BOX 190719 
Boise, ID 83719 
****************************************************************************** 
I. ADDITIONAL REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
1. This Court need not and should not apply Idaho Code§ 41-1839 retroactively. 
The District Court was correct in its analysis that Idaho Code § 41-1839 is not a 
discretionary attorneys fees statute and should therefor not be applied retroactively. Ferrells have 
not argued and do not intend to argue that Idaho Code§ 41 1839 should be applied retroactively. 
It is not a discretionary statute, and the law as it existed when the Complaint was filed is the law that 
should be applied in this case. That is Idaho Code § 41-183 9 as amended in July, 2010, which 
clearly provides for attorneys fees in arbitration. 
Idaho Code § 41-1839 is titled "Allowance of attorney's fees in suits against or in 
arbitration with insurers." It provides as follows: 
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, guaranty 
or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a period of thirty 
(30) days after proof ofloss has been furnished as provided in such policy, certificate 
or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the amount justly due under such 
policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action thereafter brought against the insurer 
in any court in this state or in any arbitration for recovery under the terms of the 
policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge 
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action or arbitration. 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839 (2010) (Emphasis added to show the 2010 amendments.) 
This is not discretionary. The statute uses the word "shall" pay attorneys fees. Therefore, 
the District Court needed only to address the "two requirements for an insured to be entitled to an 
award of attorney fees: (1) the insured must provide a proof of loss as required by the insurance 
policy; and (2) the insurer must fail to pay the amount justly due within thirty days after receipt of 
the proof ofloss." Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746-47, 152 P.3d 614, 
617-18 (2007). 
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Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 233 P.3d 1221, 1249-1250 (Idaho 2010). 
United Financial does not dispute that the Ferrells proved these two requirements, so the 
District Court erred in not awarding the Ferrells attorney fees. 
2. Unless this Court changes the law it set forth in Unity Light & Power Co. v. City 
of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 (1968) and State ex Ref Wasden v. Diacel 
Chemical Industries, Inc., 141 Idaho 102, 106 P.3d 428 (2005) this Court must 
apply, and the District Court should have applied, the law as it existed when the 
Complaint and Answer were filed. 
This Court could decide this appeal by merely refusing to overrule Unity and Diacel. Neither 
the District Court, nor United Financial cited any law disagreeing with these holdings. Without any 
authority for doing so, the District Court decided to apply the law as it existed at the time the F errells 
requested arbitration. This was certainly a reasonable position, but it did not comply with the law, 
and it was therefor error. 
The Ferrells acknowledge that the Unity and Diacel cases did not involve arbitration. 
Nevertheless, the District Court should have applied them. Otherwise, District Courts will not have 
a clear rule for which law to apply. A clear rule is especially important in arbitration actions since 
arbitration actions do not have a clear beginning. In an arbitration action, there are many choices for 
law to apply: the time of the signing of the insurance contract requiring arbitration, the time of the 
accident, the time the fees began incurring, the time arbitration was demanded, the time arbitration 
was accepted, or the time the actual arbitration began, among others. In order to avoid further 
appeals the District Courts need a clear rule, and the Idaho Supreme Court has given them one. 
Actions should be adjudicated in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the filing of the 
complaint or answer. See Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 
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(1968); State ex Rel Wasden v. Diacel Chemical Industries, Inc., 141 Idaho 102, 106 P.3d 428 
(2005). 
Even if this Court finds that the District Court was correct in applying the law in effect at the 
time the arbitration was demanded and not at the time the complaint was filed, the District Court 
erred in its application of that law. This has been discussed in Appellant's Brief. In summary, the 
District Court should have applied the ruling in the Martin case and not the dicta in the Barbee case. 
3. This was not a case filed solely for attorneys fees. 
In Barbee, the plaintiff filed two lawsuits. One to confirm the arbitration award and amend 
the damages award, and a second for attorneys fees only. 
Here, there is only one lawsuit, and despite United Financial's attempts to characterize 
this lawsuit as one for only attorney fees, this lawsuit seeks four things. The first is confirmation of 
the arbitration award (at the time Ferrells filed the lawsuit, no award had been tendered). The second 
and third are the issues of fees and costs. These two issues could not have been resolved short of 
a lawsuit because the arbitrators declined to decide these issues. The last issue is the amount of 
interest the Ferrells were entitled to. United Financial tendered interest for the entire arbitration at 
the post -judgement rate, which is less than the prejudgment rate. Before filing a lawsuit, the attorney 
for the Ferrells wrote a letter to United Financial requesting that this be remedied, and United 
Financial never responded. Only shortly before this appeal was filed and after months oflitigation 
in the District Court, the parties settled that issue by Stipulation. At that same time, the parties 
settled the issue of confirmation of the award. These two issues also could not have been resolved 
short of a lawsuit. 
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4. The District Court erred in relying on United Financial's late submission of 
evidence regarding costs to reconsider its award of costs. 
I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(A) states "costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party 
or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) states in part that "[f]ailure to 
timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of all objections to 
the costs claimed." Emphasis added. 
On March 11, 2010, the Ferrells filed their motion for attorneys fees and costs and affidavit 
of fees and costs. Oral argument on the motion for fees and costs was held on April 6, 2011. Tr. pp. 
11-40. This was 26 days after Ferrells filed their Affidavit of Fees and Costs setting forth their 
requested fees and costs with billings attached. R. p. 55. Before the oral argument, United 
Financial never objected to an award of costs, but at the hearing, for the first time, United Financial 
objected to costs and brought up the argument that the insurance contract provided that the parties 
would pay their own costs. United Financial had faxed the insurance contract to the Ferrells and 
to the Court only minutes before the hearing, and neither the Ferrells nor the District Court had 
received it or reviewed it before the hearing. The District Court found that Ferrells did not object 
to the admission of the insurance contract and to this new argument at the hearing on April 6, 2011. 
Based upon this, the District Court reconsidered its award of costs and denied Ferrells costs. 
In fact, although on April 6, 2011, the insurance contract had not been submitted into 
evidence, and counsel for Ferrells had not seen what United Financial was trying to put into 
evidence, Ferrells did object. Ferrells argued in regards to costs under I.R.C.P. 54( d) as follows: 
MR. WESSEL: And, in fact, under 54(d)(6), they need to do an objection to costs 
within 14 days of service of memorandum of costs, and failure to timely object to 
items of memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of all objections to the costs. 
Tr. p. 21, 1.25-p. 22, 1. 4. 
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* * * 
THE COURT: And I take it there was no objection to the Court considering the 
contract? 
MR. WESSEL: Well, I don't know what he has put- I haven't seen it, so if it's the 
contract, I wouldn't have an objection to the Court looking at it. I'd like to look at 
it first and make sure it's what Mr. Lerma says it is. 
THE COURT: Okay. If you see it and you have any problem with it, notify the 
Court. Otherwise the Court will consider it and issue a written decision. Tr. p. 39, 
1.13-20, p.39, 1. 25- p. 40, 1. 2. 
In addition to Ferrells' objection to the admission of the insurance contract at the hearing on 
April6, 2010, as soon as Ferrells received the late submission they saw a problem with the document 
and notified the Court. They filed a written objection to the admission of the document on April11, 
2010. Tr. pp. 98-99. 
Again, even if the District Court was correct in its analysis that the insurance contract should 
trump the Idaho Court Rules, a late submission of the contract does not satisfy the requirements of 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6). This Court has found many times that failure to object to costs within 14 days 
constitutes waiver of all objections to costs. (Emphasis added). See Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 
799, 241 P.3d 972 (2010); Conner v. Dake, 103 Idaho 761, 653 P.2d 11; Long v. Hendricks, 109 
Idaho 73, 705 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1985); Griffin v. Griffin, 102 Idaho 858, 642 P.2d 949 (Ct. App. 
1982). 
5. Ferrells cited attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839 as one of the 
issues on appeal in paragraph 3, page 7 of Appellant's brief. 
In its response brief, United Financial argues that Ferrells failed to cite attorney fees on 
appeal as an issue on appeal. This is incorrect. 
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II. CONCLUSION 
The District Court found the Ferrells to be the prevailing party at arbitration. They arc 
therefore entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(A), and 
I.A.R. Rule 41. The District Court erred in its application of the law, and United Financial cites 
nothing in its briefing that would justifY overturning this Court's prior case law. 
DATED this ( 7-day of April, 2012. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: :;_~q_:_C~~ 
acob S. Wessel, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellants Sam and DevaFerrell 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the day of April, 2011, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served upon the following persons 
at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with 
the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
John J. Lerma 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA 
3045 E. Copper Point Dr. 
PO BOX 190719 
Boise, ID 83 719 
JSW 
7083\Appeals\002 
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[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C. 
By: 
